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Abstract
A survey is given of results about coherence for categories with finite
products and coproducts. For these results, which were published pre-
viously by the authors in several places, some formulations and proofs
are here corrected, and matters are updated. The categories investigated
in this paper formalize equality of proofs in classical and intuitionistic
conjunctive-disjunctive logic without distribution of conjunction over dis-
junction.
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1 Coherence
Categorists call coherence what logicians would probably call completeness. This
is, roughly speaking, the question whether we have assumed for a particular
brand of categories all the equations between arrows we should have assumed.
Completeness need not be understood here as completeness with respect to
models. We may have also a syntactical notion of completeness—something
like the Post completeness of the classical propositional calculus—but often
some sort of model-theoretical completeness is implicit in coherence questions.
Matters are made more complicated by the fact that categorists do not like
to talk about syntax, and do not perceive the problem as being one of finding
a match between syntax and semantics. They do not talk of formal systems,
axioms and models.
Moreover, questions that logicians would consider to be questions of decid-
ability, which is of course not the same as completeness, are involved in what
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categorists call coherence. A coherence problem often involves the question of
deciding whether two terms designate the same arrow, i.e. whether a diagram
of arrows commutes. Coherence is understood mostly as solving this problem,
which we call the commuting problem, in [22] (see p. 117, which mentions [20]
and [21] as the origin of this understanding). The commuting problem seems to
be involved also in the understanding of coherence of [17] (Section 10).
Completeness and decidability, though distinct, are not foreign to each other.
A completeness proof with respect to a manageable model may provide, more or
less immediately, tools to solve decision problems. For example, the complete-
ness proof for the classical propositional calculus with respect to the two-element
Boolean algebra provides immediately a decision procedure for theoremhood.
The simplest coherence questions are those where it is intended that all
arrows of the same type should be equal, i.e. where the category envisaged is a
preorder. The oldest coherence problem is of that kind. This problem has to do
with monoidal categories, and was solved by Mac Lane in [23]. The monoidal
category freely generated by a set of objects is a preorder. So Mac Lane could
claim that showing coherence is showing that “all diagrams commute”.
In cases where coherence amounts to showing preorder, i.e. showing that
from a given set of equations, assumed as axioms, we can derive all equations
(provided the equated terms are of the same type), from a logical point of view
we have to do with axiomatizability. We want to show that a decidable set
of axioms (and we wish this set to be as simple as possible, preferably given
by a finite number of axiom schemata) delivers all the intended equations. If
preorder is intended, then all equations are intended. Axiomatizability is in
general connected with logical questions of completeness, and a standard logical
notion of completeness is completeness of a set of axioms. Where all diagrams
should commute, coherence does not seem to be a question of model-theoretical
completeness, but even in such cases it may be conceived that the model involved
is a discrete category.
Categorists are interested in axiomatizations that permit extensions. These
extensions are in a new language, with new axioms, and such extensions of the
axioms of monoidal categories need not yield preorders any more. Categorists
are also interested, when they look for axiomatizations, in finding the combi-
natorial building blocks of the matter. The axioms are such building blocks,
as in knot theory the Reidemeister moves are the combinatorial building blocks
of knot and link equivalence (see [3], Chapter 1, or any other textbook in knot
theory).
In Mac Lane’s second coherence result of [23], which has to do with sym-
metric monoidal categories, it is not intended that all equations between arrows
of the same type should hold. What Mac Lane does can be described in logical
terms in the following manner. On the one hand, he has an axiomatization,
and, on the other hand, he has a model category where arrows are permuta-
tions; then he shows that his axiomatization is complete with respect to this
model. It is no wonder that his coherence problem reduces to the completeness
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problem for the usual axiomatization of symmetric groups.
Algebraists do not speak of axiomatizations, but of presentations by gen-
erators and relations. The axiomatizations we envisage are purely equational
axiomatizations, as in algebraic varieties. Such were the axiomatizations of
[23]. Categories are algebras with partial operations, and we are interested in
the equational theories of these algebras.
In Mac Lane’s coherence results for monoidal and symmetric monoidal cat-
egories one has to deal only with natural isomorphisms. However, in the coher-
ence result for symmetric monoidal closed categories of [19] there are already
natural and dinatural transformations that are not isomorphisms.
A natural transformation is tied to a relation between the argument-places of
the functor in the source and the argument-places of the functor in the target.
This relation corresponds to a relation between occurrences of letters in for-
mulae, and in composing natural transformations we compose these relations.
With dinatural transformations the matter is more complicated, and compo-
sition poses particular problems (see [24]). In this paper we deal with natural
transformations. Our general notion of coherence does not, however, presuppose
naturality and dinaturality.
Our notion of a coherence result is one that covers Mac Lane’s and Kelly’s
coherence results mentioned above, but it is more general. We call coherence a
result that tells us that there is a faithful functor G from a category S freely
generated in a certain class of categories to a “manageable” category M. This
calls for some explanation.
It is desirable, though perhaps not absolutely necessary, that the functor G
be structure-preserving, which means that it preserves structure at least up to
isomorphism. In all coherence results we will consider here, the functor G will
preserve structure strictly, i.e. “on the nose”. The categories S and M will be
in the same class of categories, and G will be obtained by extending in a unique
way a map from the generators of S into M.
The category M is manageable when equations of arrows, i.e. commuting
diagrams of arrows, are easier to consider in it than in S. The best is if the
commuting problem is obviously decidable in M, while it was not obvious that
it is such in S.
With our approach to coherence we are oriented towards solving the com-
muting problem. This should be stressed because other authors may give a
more prominent place to other problems. We have used on purpose the not
very precise term “manageable” for the category M to leave room for modi-
fications of our notion of coherence, which would be oriented towards solving
another problem than the commuting problem.
In this paper, the manageable category M will be the category Rel with
arrows being relations between occurrences of letters in formulae. In [14] and
elsewhere we have taken Rel to be the category of relations between finite or-
dinals, which is not essentially different from what we do in this paper. The
previous category Rel is the skeleton of the new one. We have mentioned above
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the connection between Rel and natural transformations. The commuting prob-
lem in Rel is obviously decidable.
The freely generated category S will be the bicartesian category, i.e. cate-
gory with all finite products and coproducts, freely generated by a set of objects,
or a related category of that kind. The generating set of objects may be con-
ceived as a discrete category. In our understanding of coherence, replacing this
discrete generating category by an arbitrary category would prevent us to solve
coherence—simply because the commuting problem in the arbitrary generating
category may be undecidable. Far from having more general, stronger, results
if the generating category is arbitrary, we may end up by having no result at
all.
The categories S in this paper are built ultimately out of syntactic mate-
rial, as logical systems are built. Categorists are not inclined to formulate their
coherence results in the way we do—in particular, they do not deal often with
syntactically built categories. If, however, more involved and more abstract for-
mulations of coherence that may be found in the literature (for early references
on this matter see [18]) have practical consequences for solving the commuting
problem, our way of formulating coherence has these consequences as well.
That there is a faithful structure-preserving functor G from the syntactical
category S to the manageable categoryM means that for all arrows f and g of
S with the same source and the same target we have
f = g in S iff Gf = Gg in M.
The direction from left to right in this equivalence is contained in the functori-
ality of G, while the direction from right to left is faithfulness proper.
If S is conceived as a syntactical system, whileM is a model, the faithfulness
equivalence we have just stated is like a completeness result in logic. The left-to-
right direction, i.e. functoriality, is soundness, while the right-to-left direction,
i.e. faithfulness, is completeness proper.
If G happens to be one-one on objects, then we obtain that S is isomorphic
to a subcategory of M—namely, its image under G in M. We will have such a
situation in this paper, where G will be identity on objects.
In this paper we will separate coherence results involving terminal objects
and initial objects from those not involving them. These objects cause diffi-
culties, and the statements and proofs of the coherence results gain by having
these difficulties kept apart.
2 Coherence and proof theory
If one envisages a deductive system as a graph whose nodes are formulae:
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A ∧ A
⊤
A
C ∧ (C → A)
✲ ✲
✲
❄
✻
❄❄◗
◗
◗
◗
◗
◗❦
✛ ✛
❄ ❄
✔
✕✖✻
and whose arrows are derivations from the sources understood as premises to
the targets understood as conclusions, then equality of derivations usually trans-
forms this deductive system into a category of a particular brand. This category
has a structure induced by the connectives of the deductive system. Although
equality of derivation is dictated by logical concerns, usually the categories we
end up with are of a kind that categorists have already introduced for their
own reasons. The prime example here is given by the deductive system for
the conjunction-implication fragment of intuitionistic propositional logic. Af-
ter derivations in this deductive system are equated according to ideas about
normalization of derivations that stem from Gentzen, one obtains the cartesian
closed category K freely generated by a set of propositional letters (see [22] for
the notion of cartesian closed category).
Equality of proofs in intuitionistic logic has not led up to now to a coherence
result—a coherence theorem is not forthcoming for cartesian closed categories.
If we take that the model category M is a category whose arrows are graphs
like the graphs of [19], then we do not have a faithful functor G from the free
cartesian closed category K to M. We will now explain why G is not even a
functor.
If ηp,q is the canonical arrow from q to p→ (p∧ q), where A→ B and A∧B
stand for BA and A×B respectively, while wˆA is the diagonal arrow from A to
A ∧ A, then G(wˆp→(p∧q) ◦ ηp,q):
( p → ( p ∧ q ) ) ∧ ( p → ( p ∧ q ) )
q
✓ ✏✬ ✩✓ ✏✛ ✘
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
❧
❧
❧
❧
❧
❧
which is obtained from
5
( p → ( p ∧ q ) ) ∧ ( p → ( p ∧ q ) )
p → ( p ∧ q )
q
❆
❆
✓ ✏
✟✟✟✟
✟✟✟✟
✟✟✟✟
PPPPPP
PPPPPP
PPPPPP
Gwˆp→(p∧q)
Gηp,q
is different from G((ηp,q ∧ ηp,q) ◦ wˆq):
( p → ( p ∧ q ) ) ∧ ( p → ( p ∧ q ) )
q
✓ ✏ ✓ ✏
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
❧
❧
❧
❧
❧
❧
which is obtained from
( p → ( p ∧ q ) ) ∧ ( p → ( p ∧ q ) )
q ∧ q
q
✪
✪
❅
❅
✓ ✏ ✓ ✏✪
✪
❝
❝❝
G(ηp,q ∧ ηp,q)
Gwˆq
So, if wˆ is a natural transformation, then G is not a functor. The naturality of wˆ,
and other arrows of that kind, tied to structural rules (wˆ is tied to contraction,
and kˆ1 below to thinning), is desirable because it corresponds to the permuting
of these rules in a cut-elimination or normalization procedure.
Dually, if εp,q is the canonical arrow from p ∧ (p→ q) to q, and kˆ1A,B is the
first projection from A ∧B to A, then G(kˆ1r,q ◦ (1r ∧ εp,q)):
r
r ∧ ( p ∧ ( p → q ) )
❡
❡
❡
❡
❡ ✒ ✑
which is obtained from
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rr ∧ q
r ∧ ( p ∧ ( p → q ) )
❡
❡
❡
❡
✪
✪✒ ✑
Gkˆ1r,q
G(1r ∧ εp,q)
is different from Gkˆ1
r,p∧(p→q):
r
r ∧ ( p ∧ ( p → q ) )
❡
❡
❡
❡
❡
So, if kˆ1 is a natural transformation, then G is not a functor. The faithfulness of
G fails because of a counterexample in [27], involving a natural number object
in Set and the successor function. This does not exclude that with a more
sophisticated model category M we might still be able to obtain coherence for
cartesian closed categories (for an attempt along these lines see [25]).
Equality of proofs in classical logic may, however, lead to coherence with
respect to model categories that catch up to a point the idea of generality of
proofs. Such is in particular the category Rel mentioned in the preceding sec-
tion, whose arrows are relations between occurrences of propositional letters
in the premises and conclusions. The idea that generality of proofs may serve
as a criterion for identity of proofs stems from Lambek’s pioneering papers in
categorial proof theory of the late 1960s (see [22] for references). This criterion
says, roughly, that two derivations represent the same proof when their gen-
eralizations with respect to diversification of variables (without changing the
rules of inference) produce derivations with the same source and target, up to
a renaming of variables.
Although coherence with respect to Rel is related to generality, it is not
exactly that. The question is should Gwˆp be the relation in the left one or in
the right one of the following two diagrams:
✓✏
✁
✁
❆
❆
✁
✁
❆
❆
p ∧ p p ∧ p
p p
The second option, induced by dealing with equivalence relations, or by con-
necting all letters that must remain the same in generalizing proofs (see [12]
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and [13]), would lead to abolishing the naturality of wˆ. For example, in the
following instance of the naturality equation for wˆ:
wˆp ◦ κˇp = (κˇp ∧ κˇp) ◦ wˆ⊥
for κˇp being the unique arrow from the initial object ⊥ to p, we do not have
that G(wˆp ◦ κˇp) is equal to G((κˇp ∧ κˇp) ◦ wˆ⊥):
✓✏
✁
✁
❆
❆
p ∧ p
p
⊥
p ∧ p
⊥ ∧ ⊥
⊥
Gwˆp
Gκˇp Gwˆ⊥
G(κˇp ∧ κˇp)
We obtain similarly that κ cannot be natural.
It is shown in [14] that coherence with respect to the model category Rel
could justify plausibly equality of derivations in various systems of propositional
logic, including classical propositional logic. The goal of that book was to ex-
plore the limits of coherence with respect to the model category Rel. This does
not exclude that other coherence results may involve other model categories,
and, in particular, with a model category different from Rel, classical propo-
sitional logic may induce a different notion of Boolean category than the one
introduced in Chapter 14 of [14]. That notion of Boolean category was not
motivated a priori, but was dictated by coherence with respect to Rel. The def-
inition of that notion was however not given via coherence, but via an equational
axiomatization. We take such definitions as being proper axiomatic definitions.
We could easily define nonaxiomatically a notion of Boolean category with
respect to graphs of the Kelly-Mac Lane kind (see [19]). Equality of graphs
would dictate what arrows are equal. In this notion, conjunction would not be
a product, because the diagonal arrows and the projections would not make
natural transformations (see above), and, analogously, disjunction would not be
a coproduct (cf. [14], Section 14.3.) The resulting notion of Boolean category
would not be trivial—the freely generated categories of that kind would not
be preorders—, but its nonaxiomatic definition would be trivial. There might
exist a nontrivial equational axiomatic definition of this notion. Finding such a
definition is an open problem.
We are looking for nontrivial axiomatic definitions because such definitions
give information about the combinatorial building blocks of our notions, as
Reidemeister moves give information about the combinatorial building blocks
of knot equivalence. Our axiomatic equational definition of Boolean category in
[14] is of the nontrivial, combinatorially informative, kind. Coherence of these
Boolean categories with respect to Rel is a theorem, whose proof in [14] requires
considerable effort.
Another analogous example is provided by the notion of monoidal category,
which was introduced in a not entirely axiomatic way, via coherence, by Be´nabou
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in [2], and in the axiomatic way, such as we favour, by Mac Lane in [23]. For
Be´nabou, coherence is built into the definition, and for Mac Lane it is a theorem.
One could analogously define the theorems of classical propositional logic as
being the tautologies (this is done, for example, in [4], Sections 1.2-3), in which
case completeness would not be a theorem, but would be built into the definition.
In this paper we prove coherence for categories that formalize equality of
proofs in classical and intuitionistic conjunctive-disjunctive logic without distri-
bution of conjunction over disjunction. This fragment of logic also covers the
additive connectives of linear and other substructural logics (where distribution
anyway should not be assumed). When to this fragment we add the true and
absurd propositional constants matters become more complicated, and we do
not know how to prove unrestricted coherence in all cases.
3 Lattice categories
In the remaining sections of this paper we deal with coherence with respect to
Rel for categories with a double cartesian structure, i.e. with finite products and
finite coproducts. We take this as a categorification of the notion of lattice. As
before, we distinguish cases with and without special objects, which are here the
empty product and the empty coproduct, i.e. the terminal and initial objects.
Categories with all finite products and coproducts, including the empty ones,
are usually called bicartesian categories (see [22]). Categories with all nonempty
finite products and coproducts are called lattice categories in [14]. The results
presented here are adapted from [9], [11], the revised version of [10] and [14],
Chapter 9.
We pay particular attention to questions of maximality, i.e. to the impossibil-
ity of extending our axioms without collapse into preorder, and hence triviality.
This maximality is a kind of syntactical completeness. (The sections on max-
imality improve upon results reported in [9], [11] and [10], and are taken over
from [14], Chapter 9.)
Our techniques are partly based on a composition elimination for conjunctive
logic, related to normalization in natural deduction, and on a simple compo-
sition elimination for conjunctive-disjunctive logic, implicit in Gentzen’s cut
elimination.
We define now the category L built out of syntactic material. The objects
of the category L are the formulae of the propositional language L, generated
out of a set of infinitely many propositional letters, for which we use p, q, r, . . .,
sometimes with indices, with the binary connectives ∧ and ∨, for which we use
ξ . For formulae we use A, B, C, . . ., sometimes with indices.
To define the arrows of L, we define first inductively a set of expressions
called the arrow terms of L. Every arrow term will have a type, which is an
ordered pair of formulae of L∧. We write f : A ⊢ B when the arrow term f is
of type (A,B). Here A is the source, and B the target of f . For arrow terms
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we use f , g, h, . . ., sometimes with indices. Intuitively, the arrow term f is the
code of a derivation of the conclusion B from the premise A (which explains
why we write ⊢ instead of →).
For all formulae A, B and C of L the following primitive arrow terms :
1A : A ⊢ A,
wˆA : A ⊢ A ∧ A, wˇA : A ∨A ⊢ A,
kˆiA1,A2 : A1 ∧ A2 ⊢ Ai, kˇ
i
A1,A2
: Ai ⊢ A1 ∨ A2, for i ∈ {1, 2},
are arrow terms. (Intuitively, these are the axioms of our logic with the codes
of their trivial derivations.)
Next we have the following inductive clauses:
if f : A ⊢ B and g : B ⊢ C are arrow terms,
then (g ◦ f) : A ⊢ C is an arrow term;
if f1 : A1 ⊢ B1 and f2 : A2 ⊢ B2 are arrow terms,
then (f1 ξ f2) : A1 ξ A2 ⊢ B1 ξ B2 is an arrow term.
(Intuitively, the operations on arrow terms ◦ and ξ are codes of the rules of
inference of our logic.) This defines the arrow terms of L. As we do usually
with formulae, we will omit the outermost parentheses of arrow terms.
We stipulate first that all the instances of f = f and of the following equa-
tions are equations of L:
categorial equations :
(cat 1) f ◦ 1A = 1B ◦ f = f : A ⊢ B,
(cat 2) h ◦ (g ◦ f) = (h ◦ g) ◦ f ,
bifunctorial equations :
(ξ 1) 1A ξ 1B = 1AξB,
(ξ 2) (g1 ◦ f1) ξ (g2 ◦ f2) = (g1 ξ g2) ◦ (f1 ξ f2),
naturality equations : for f : A ⊢ B and fi : Ai ⊢ Bi, where i ∈ {1, 2},
(wˆ nat) (f ∧ f) ◦ wˆA = wˆB ◦ f ,
(wˇ nat) f ◦ wˇA = wˇB ◦ (f ∨ f),
(kˆi nat) fi ◦ kˆ
i
A1,A2
= kˆiB1,B2
◦ (f1 ∧ f2),
(kˇi nat) (f1 ∨ f2) ◦ kˇiA1,A2 = kˇ
i
B1,B2
◦ fi,
triangular equations : for i ∈ {1, 2},
(wˆkˆ) kˆiA,A ◦ wˆA= 1A,
(wˇkˇ) wˇA ◦ kˇ
i
A,A= 1A,
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(wˆkˆkˆ) (kˆ1A,B ∧ kˆ
2
A,B) ◦ wˆA∧B = 1A∧B,
(wˇkˇkˇ) wˇA∨B ◦ (kˇ
1
A,B ∨ kˇ
2
A,B)= 1A∨B.
This concludes the list of axiomatic equations stipulated for L. To define
all the equations of L it remains only to say that the set of these equations is
closed under symmetry and transitivity of equality and under the rules
(◦ cong)
f = f ′ g = g′
g ◦ f = g′ ◦ f ′
(ξ cong)
f1 = f
′
1 f2 = f
′
2
f1 ξ f2 = f
′
1 ξ f
′
2
On the arrow terms of L we impose the equations of L. This means that an
arrow of L is an equivalence class of arrow terms of L defined with respect to
the smallest equivalence relation such that the equations of L are satisfied (see
[14], Section 2.3, for details).
The kind of category for which L is the one freely generated out of the set
of propositional letters (which may be understood as a discrete category) we
call lattice category (see [14], Section 9.4, for a precise definition). Usually,
such categories would be called categories with finite nonempty products and
coproducts. The objects of a lattice category that is a partial order make a
lattice.
4 The functor G
The objects of the category Rel are the objects of L, i.e. the formulae of L.
An arrow R : A ⊢ B of Rel is a set of ordered pairs (x, y) such that x is an
occurrence of a propositional letter in the formula A and y is an occurrence
of a propositional letter in the formula B; in other words, arrows are binary
relations between the sets of occurrences of propositional letters in formulae.
We write either (x, y) ∈ R or xRy, as usual. In this category, 1A : A ⊢ A is
the identity relation, i.e. identity function, that assigns to every occurrence of
a propositional letter in A that same occurrence. In L there are no formulae
in which no propositional letter occurs, but where we have such formulae (as
in the language L⊤,⊥ considered later in this paper), the empty set of ordered
pairs corresponds to 1A : A ⊢ A if no propositional letter occurs in A. The
empty relation is the identity relation on the empty set.
For R1 : A ⊢ B and R2 : B ⊢ C, the set of ordered pairs of the composition
R2 ◦R1 : A ⊢ C is {(x, y) | ∃z(xR1z and zR2y)}. Let xj(A) be the j-th occur-
rence of a propositional letter in A counting from the left, and let |A| be the num-
ber of occurrences of propositional letters in A (so 1 ≤ j ≤ |A|). ForRi : Ai ⊢ Bi,
with i ∈ {1, 2}, the set of ordered pairs of R1 ξ R2 : A1 ξ A2 ⊢ B1 ξ B2, for
ξ ∈ {∧,∨}, is the disjoint union of the following two sets:
{(xj(A1 ξ A2), xk(B1 ξ B2)) | (xj(A1), xk(B1)) ∈ R1},
{(xj+|A1|(A1 ξ A2), xk+|B1|(B1 ξ B2)) | (xj(A2), xk(B2)) ∈ R2}.
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With the operation on objects that corresponds to the binary connective ξ , this
operation ξ on arrows gives a biendofunctor in Rel.
In Rel we have the relations GwˆA : A ⊢ A ∧ A, GwˇA : A ∨ A ⊢ A, Gkˆ
i
A1,A2
:
A1 ∧ A2 ⊢ Ai, and GkˇiA1,A2 : Ai ⊢ A1 ∨ A2, for i ∈ {1, 2}, whose sets of ordered
pairs are defined as follows:
(xj(A), xk(A ∧ A)) ∈ GwˆA iff (xk(A ∨ A), xj(A)) ∈ GwˇA iff j ≡ k (mod |A|);
(xj(A1 ∧ A2), xk(A1)) ∈ Gkˆ1A1,A2 iff (xk(A1), xj(A1 ∨ A2)) ∈ Gkˇ
1
A1,A2
iff j = k;
(xj(A1 ∧ A2), xk(A2)) ∈ Gkˆ2A1,A2 iff (xk(A2), xj(A1 ∨ A2)) ∈ Gkˇ
2
A1,A2
iff
j = k+|A1|.
It is not difficult to check that all these arrows of Rel give rise to natural
transformations. This is clear from the graphical representation of relations in
Rel. Here are a few examples of such graphical representations, with sources
written at the top and targets at the bottom:
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
❆
❆
❆
❆
❆
❆
❆
❆
❆
❆
❆
❆
❆
❆
❆
❆
❆
❆
❇
❇
❇
❇
❇
❇
✂
✂
✂
✂
✂
✂
q q q q q q q
q q q q q
((p ∧ q) ∨ p)∧((p ∧ q) ∨ p) p
(p ∧ q) ∨ p p ∨ p
Gwˆ(p∧q)∨p Gwˇp
❇
❇
❇
❇
❇
❇
❇
❇
❇
❇
❇
❇
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
q q q q qq q q
q q q q q q q q
p ∨ q ((q ∨ r)∧ p)∨(p ∧ (q ∨ p))
(p ∨ q)∧((q ∧ p)∧ r) p ∧(q ∨ p)
Gkˆ1
p∨q,(q∧p)∧r
Gkˇ2(q∨r)∧p,p∧(q∨p)
For R : A ⊢ B, the naturality equation
(R ∧R) ◦GwˆA = GwˆB ◦R,
which corresponds to the equation (wˇ nat) of the preceding section, and which
we take as an example, is justified in the following manner via graphs:
✂
✂
✂
❇
❇
❇
 
 
 
 
 
 
✂
✂
✂
❇
❇
❇
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
 
 
 
 
 
 
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
✂
✂
✂
❇
❇
❇
B
A
B
R R
R
B
A
B
AA
B
GwˆA
GwˆB
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We can now define a functor G from the category L to the category Rel. On
objects we have that GA is A. We have defined G above on the primitive arrow
terms of L, and we have
G(f ξ g) = Gf ξ Gg,
G(g ◦ f) = Gg ◦Gf.
To ascertain that this defines a functor from L to Rel, it remains to check that
if f = g in L, then Gf = Gg in Rel, which we do by induction on the length of
the derivation of f = g in L.
It is easy to check by induction that if for f : A ⊢ B we have (xj(A), xk(B)) ∈
Gf , then xj(A) and xk(B) are occurrences of the same propositional letter.
Our first task in this paper is to show that the functor G from L to Rel is
faithful. We call this result Lattice Coherence, and we say that L is coherent.
Since G is identity on objects, this means that L is isomorphic to a subcategory
of Rel.
It is clear that if L is coherent in the sense just specified, then it is decidable
whether arrow terms of L are equal in L. In logical terms, one would say that
the coherence of L implies the decidability of the equational system used to
define L. This is because equality of arrows is clearly decidable in Rel. So
coherence here implies a solution to the commuting problem.
5 Coherence for lattice categories
We define by induction a set of terms for the arrows of L that we call Gentzen
terms. The identity arrow terms 1A are Gentzen terms, and we assume that
Gentzen terms are closed under the following operations on arrow terms, besides
the operation ◦ , where =dn is read “denotes”:
f1 : C ⊢ A1 f2 : C ⊢ A2
〈f1, f2〉 =dn (f1 ∧ f2) ◦ wˆC : C ⊢ A1 ∧ A2
gi : Ai ⊢ C
KˆiA3−igi =dn gi ◦ kˆ
i
A1,A2
: A1 ∧A2 ⊢ C
g1 : A1 ⊢ C g2 : A2 ⊢ C
[g1, g2] =dn wˇC ◦ (g1 ∨ g2) : A1 ∨A2 ⊢ C
fi : C ⊢ Ai
KˇiA3−ifi =dn kˇ
i
A1,A2
◦ fi : C ⊢ A1 ∨ A2
It is easy to verify that the following equations hold for Gentzen terms (these
equations can serve for an alternative formulation of L):
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(Kˆ1) g ◦ KˆiAf = Kˆ
i
A(g ◦ f), (Kˇ1) Kˇ
i
Ag ◦ f = Kˇ
i
A(g ◦ f),
(Kˆ2) KˆiAg ◦ 〈f1, f2〉 = g ◦ fi, (Kˇ2) [g1, g2] ◦ Kˇ
i
Af = gi ◦ f ,
(Kˆ3) 〈g1, g2〉 ◦ f = 〈g1 ◦ f, g2 ◦ f〉, (Kˇ3) g ◦ [f1, f2] = [g ◦ f1, g ◦ f2],
(Kˆ4) 1A∧B = 〈Kˆ1B1A, Kˆ
2
A1B〉, (Kˇ4) 1A∨B = [Kˇ
1
B1A, Kˇ
2
A1B],
(Kˆ5) KˆiD〈f1, f2〉 = 〈Kˆ
i
Df1, Kˆ
i
Df2〉, (Kˇ5) Kˇ
i
D[g1, g2] = [Kˇ
i
Dg1, Kˇ
i
Dg2],
(KˆKˇ) KˆiCKˇ
j
Dh = Kˇ
j
DKˆ
i
Ch,
with appropriate types assigned to f , g, fi and gi.
It is very easy to show that for every arrow term of L there is a Gentzen
term denoting the same arrow. We can prove the following theorem for L.
Composition Elimination. For every arrow term h there is a composition-
free Gentzen term h′ such that h = h′.
Proof. We find first a Gentzen term denoting the same arrow as h. Take a
subterm g ◦ f of this Gentzen term such that both f and g are composition-free.
We call such a subterm a topmost cut. We show that g ◦ f is equal either to
a composition-free Gentzen term or to a Gentzen term all of whose composi-
tions occur in topmost cuts of strictly smaller length than the length of g ◦ f .
The possibility of eliminating composition in topmost cuts, and hence every
composition, follows by induction on the length of topmost cuts.
The cases where f or g are 1A are taken care of by (cat 1); the cases where
f is KˆiAf
′ are taken care of by (Kˆ1); and the case where g is 〈g1, g2〉 is taken
care of by (Kˆ3).
We have next cases dual to the last two, where g is KˇiAg
′, which is taken
care of by (Kˇ1), and where f is [f1, f2], which is taken care of by (Kˇ3). In the
remaining cases, if f is 〈f1, f2〉, then g is either of a form already covered by
cases above, or g is KˆiAg
′, and we apply (Kˆ2). Finally, if f is KˇiAf
′, then g is
either of a form already covered by cases above, or g is [g1, g2], and we apply
(Kˇ2). ⊣
Note that we use only the equations (Kˆ1)-(Kˆ3) and (Kˇ1)-(Kˇ3) in this proof
(which is taken over from [11], Section 3). We can then prove the following
lemma for L.
Invertibility Lemma for ∧. Let f : A1 ∧ A2 ⊢ B be a Gentzen term. If for
every (x, y) ∈ Gf we have that x is in A1, then f is equal to a Gentzen term of
the form Kˆ1A2f
′, and if for every (x, y) ∈ Gf we have that x is in A2, then f is
equal to a Gentzen term of the form Kˆ2A1f
′.
Proof. By Composition Elimination for L, we can assume that f is composi-
tion-free, and then we proceed by induction on the length of the target B (or
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on the length of f). If B is a letter, then f must be equal in L to an arrow term
of the form KˆiA3−if
′. The condition on Gf dictates whether i here is 1 or 2.
If B is B1∧B2 and f is not of the form KˆiA3−if
′, then f must be of the form
〈f1, f2〉 (the condition on Gf precludes that f be an identity arrow term). We
apply the induction hypothesis to f1 : A1 ∧ A2 ⊢ B1 and f2 : A1 ∧ A2 ⊢ B2, and
use the equation (Kˆ5).
If B is B1∨B2 and f is not of the form Kˆ
i
A3−i
f ′, then f must be of the form
Kˇ
j
B3−j
g, for j ∈ {1, 2}. We apply the induction hypothesis to g : A1 ∧ A2 ⊢ Bi,
and use the following instance of the equation (KˆKˇ):
Kˇ
j
B3−j
KˆiA3−ig
′ = KˆiA3−iKˇ
j
B3−j
g′.
⊣
We have a dual Invertibility Lemma for ∨. We can then prove the following
result of [11] (Section 4).
Lattice Coherence. The functor G from L to Rel is faithful.
Proof. Suppose f, g : A ⊢ B are arrow terms of L and Gf = Gg. We proceed
by induction on the sum of the lengths of A and B to show that f = g in L.
If A and B are both letters, then we conclude by Composition Elimination for
L that an arrow term of L of the type A ⊢ B exists iff A and B are the same
letter p, and we must have f = g = 1p in L. Note that we do not need here the
assumption Gf = Gg.
If B is B1 ∧B2, then for i ∈ {1, 2} we have that kˆiB1,B2 ◦ f and kˆ
i
B1,B2
◦ g are
of type A ⊢ Bi. We also have
G(kˆiB1,B2 ◦ f) = Gkˆ
i
B1,B2
◦Gf = GkˆiB1,B2 ◦Gg = G(kˆ
i
B1,B2
◦ g),
whence, by the induction hypothesis, we have kˆiB1,B2
◦ f = kˆiB1,B2
◦ g in L. Then
we infer
〈kˆ1B1,B2 ◦ f, kˆ
2
B1,B2
◦ f〉 = 〈kˆ1B1,B2 ◦ g, kˆ
2
B1,B2
◦ g〉,
from which f = g follows with the help of the equations (Kˆ3) and (Kˆ4). We
proceed analogously if A is A1 ∨A2.
Suppose now that A is A1 ∧A2 or a letter, and B is B1 ∨B2 or a letter, but
A and B are not both letters. Then by Composition Elimination for L we have
that f is equal in L to an arrow term of L that is either of the form f ′ ◦ kˆiA1,A2
or of the form kˇiB1,B2
◦ f ′. Suppose f = f ′ ◦ kˆ1A1,A2 . Then for every (x, y) ∈ Gf
we have x ∈ GA1.
By the Invertibility Lemma for ∧, it follows that g is equal in L to an arrow
term of the form g′ ◦ kˆ1A1,A2 . From Gf = Gg we can infer easily that Gf
′ = Gg′,
and so by the induction hypothesis f ′ = g′, and hence f = g.
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We reason analogously when f = f ′ ◦ kˆ2A1,A2 . If f = kˇ
i
B1,B2
◦ f ′, then again
we reason analogously, applying the Invertibility Lemma for ∨. ⊣
This proof of Lattice Coherence is simpler than a proof given in [11]. In the
course of that previous proof one has also coherence results for two auxiliary
categories related to L. We will need these categories later, but we do not need
these coherence results. For the sake of completeness, however, we record them
here too.
Let Lˆ∨ be the category defined as L with the difference that the primitive
arrow terms wˇ and kˇi are excluded, as well as the equations involving them.
The Gentzen formulation of Lˆ∨ is obtained by taking the operation ∨ on arrow
terms instead of the operations [ , ] and Kˇi.
The category Lˇ∧ is isomorphic to Lˆ
op
∨ . In Lˇ∧, the ∧ and ∨ of Lˆ∨ are
interchanged.
One can easily prove Composition Elimination for Lˆ∨ (and hence also for
Lˇ∧) by abbreviating the proof of Composition Elimination for L above. For Lˆ∨
we do not have the cases where f is [f1, f2] or Kˇ
i
Af
′, but f can be f1∨f2. Then,
if g is not of a form already covered by the proof above, it must be g1 ∨ g2, and
we apply the bifunctorial equation (∨ 2).
A composition-free arrow term of Lˆ∨ may be reduced to a unique normal
form, which can then be used to demonstrate coherence for Lˆ∨, i.e. the fact
that the functor G from Lˆ∨ to Rel is faithful (see [11], Section 4).
6 Coherence for sesquicartesian categories
We define now the category L⊤,⊥, whose definition extends the definition of L
with the terminal object ⊤ and the initial object ⊥, i.e. nullary product and
coproduct. The objects of this category are the formulae of the propositional
language L⊤,⊥, generated out of a set of infinitely many propositional letters
with the binary connectives ∧ and ∨, and the nullary connectives, i.e. proposi-
tional constants, ⊤ and ⊥.
The arrow terms of L⊤,⊥ are defined as the arrow terms of L save that for
every object A we have the additional primitive arrow terms
κˆA : A ⊢ ⊤, κˇA : ⊥ ⊢ A,
and for all arrow terms f : A ⊢ ⊤ and g : ⊥ ⊢ A we have the additional axiomatic
equations
(κˆ) κˆA = f , (κˇ) κˇA = g,
(kˆ⊥) kˆ1⊥,⊥ = kˆ
2
⊥,⊥, (kˇ⊤) kˇ
1
⊤,⊤ = kˇ
2
⊤,⊤.
It is easy to see that with the help of the last two equations we obtain that
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the pairs
kˆ1⊥,⊥ = kˆ
2
⊥,⊥ : ⊥ ∧ ⊥ ⊢ ⊥ and κˇ⊥∧⊥ = wˆ⊥ : ⊥ ⊢ ⊥ ∧ ⊥,
kˇ1⊤,⊤ = kˇ
2
⊤,⊤ : ⊤ ⊢ ⊤ ∨ ⊤ and κˆ⊤∨⊤ = wˇ⊤ : ⊤ ∨ ⊤ ⊢ ⊤
are inverses of each other. This shows that every letterless formula of L⊤,⊥ is
isomorphic in L⊤,⊥ either to ⊤ or to ⊥.
The kind of category for which L⊤,⊥ is the one freely generated out of the set
of propositional letters we call dicartesian category. The objects of a dicartesian
category that is a partial order make a lattice with top and bottom.
By omitting the equations (kˆ⊥) and (kˇ⊤) in the definition of L⊤,⊥ we would
obtain the bicartesian category freely generated by the set of propositional let-
ters (cf. [22], Section I.8). Dicartesian categories were considered under the
name coherent bicartesian categories in the printed version of [10].
We previously believed wrongly that we have proved coherence for dicarte-
sian, alias coherent bicartesian, categories. Lemma 5.1 of the printed version of
[10] is however not correct. We prove here only a restricted coherence result for
dicartesian categories. A study of equality of arrows in bicartesian categories
may be found in [5].
Suppose that in the definition of L⊤,⊥ we omit one of ⊤ and ⊥ from the
language, and we omit all the arrow terms and equations involving the omitted
nullary connective. When we omit ⊤, we obtain the category L⊥, and when
we omit ⊥, we obtain the category L⊤. It is clear that L⊥ is isomorphic to
L
op
⊤ . In the printed version of [10] the categories for which L⊥ is the one freely
generated by the set of propositional letters were called coherent sesquicartesian
categories. We call them now just sesquicartesian categories.
The category Set, whose objects are sets and whose arrows are functions,
with cartesian product × as ∧, disjoint union + as ∨, a singleton set {∗} as
⊤ and the empty set ∅ as ⊥, is a bicartesian category, but not a dicartesian
category. It is, however, a sesquicartesian category in the L⊥ sense, but not
in the L⊤ sense. This is because in Set we have that ∅ × ∅ is equal to ∅, but
{∗}+ {∗} is not isomorphic to {∗}.
To define the functor G from L⊤,⊥ to Rel we assume that the objects of
Rel are the formulae of L⊤,⊥. Everything else in the definition of Rel remains
unchanged; in particular, the arrows are sets of ordered pairs of occurrences of
propositional letters (no propositional constant is involved). In the definition
of the functor G we stipulate that for GκˆA and GκˇA we have the empty set of
ordered pairs. This serves also for the definition of the functors G from L⊥ and
L⊤ to Rel.
We can establish unrestricted coherence for sesquicartesian categories, with
a proof taken over from the revised version of [10], which we will present below.
(This proof differs from the proof in the printed version of [10], which relied
also on Lemma 5.1, and is not correct.) It is obtained by enlarging the proof of
Lattice Coherence.
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The Gentzen formulation of L⊤,⊥ is obtained like that of L save that we
have in addition the primitive Gentzen terms κˆA : A ⊢ ⊤ and κˇA : ⊥ ⊢ A.
For Gentzen terms we have as additional equations, besides (κˆ) and (κˇ), the
following equations:
(Kˆ⊥) Kˆ1⊥1⊥= Kˆ
2
⊥1⊥,
(Kˇ⊤) Kˇ1⊤1⊤= Kˇ
2
⊤1⊤,
which amount to (kˆ⊥) and (kˇ⊤).
We can prove Composition Elimination for L⊤,⊥ by enlarging the proof for
L. We have as new cases first those where f is κˇA or g is κˆA, which are taken
care of by the equations (κˇ) and (κˆ). The following case remains. If f is κˆA,
then g is of a form covered by cases already dealt with. Note that we do not need
the equations (Kˆ⊥) and (Kˇ⊤) for this proof (so that we have also Composition
Elimination for the free bicartesian category).
Let the category Lˆ∨,⊤,⊥ be defined like the category Lˆ∨ save that it involves
also κˆ and the equations (κˆ) and (kˆ⊥), and let the category Lˇ∧,⊤,⊥ be defined
like the category Lˇ∧ save that it involves also κˇ and the equations (κˇ) and (kˇ⊤).
Composition Elimination is provable for Lˆ∨,⊤,⊥ and Lˇ∧,⊤,⊥ by abbreviating the
proof of Composition Elimination for L⊤,⊥, in the same way as we abbreviated
the proof of Composition Elimination for L in order to obtain Composition
Elimination for Lˆ∨.
An arrow term of L⊤,⊥ is in standard form when it is of the form g ◦ f for f
an arrow term Lˆ∨,⊤,⊥ and g an arrow term of Lˇ∧,⊤,⊥. We can then prove the
following.
Standard-Form Lemma. Every arrow term of L⊤,⊥ is equal in L⊤,⊥ to an
arrow term in standard form.
Proof. By categorial and bifunctorial equations, we may assume that we deal
with a factorized arrow term f none of whose factors is a complex identity (i.e.,
f is a big composition of composition-free arrow terms none of which is equal
to an identity arrow; see [14], Sections 2.6-7, for precise definitions of these
notions) and every factor of f is either an arrow term of Lˆ∨,⊤,⊥, and then we
call it a ∧-factor, or an arrow term of Lˇ∧,⊤,⊥, when we call it a ∨-factor.
Suppose f : B ⊢ C is a ∧-factor and g : A ⊢ B is a ∨-factor. We show by
induction on the length of f ◦ g that in L⊤,⊥
(∗) f ◦ g = g′ ◦ f ′ or f ◦ g = f ′ or f ◦ g = g′
for f ′ a ∧-factor and g′ a ∨-factor.
We will consider various cases for f . In all such cases, if g is wˇB , then we
use (wˇ nat). If f is wˆB , then we use (wˆ nat). If f is kˆ
i
D,E and g is g1 ∧ g2, then
we use (kˆi nat). If f is f1 ∧ f2 and g is g1 ∧ g2, then we use bifunctorial and
categorial equations and the induction hypothesis.
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If f is f1 ∨ f2, then we have the following cases. If g is kˇiB1,B2 , then we use
(kˇi nat). If g is g1 ∨ g2, then we use bifunctorial and categorial equations and
the induction hypothesis.
Finally, cases where f is κˆB or g is κˇB are taken care of by the equations
(κˆ) and (κˇ). This proves (∗), and it is clear that (∗) is sufficient to prove the
lemma. ⊣
We can also prove Composition Elimination and an analogue of the Standard-
Form Lemma for L⊥. Next we have the following lemmata for L⊤,⊥ and L⊥.
Lemma 1. If for f, g : A ⊢ B either A or B is isomorphic to ⊤ or ⊥, then
f = g.
Proof. If A is isomorphic to ⊥ or B is isomorphic to ⊤, then the matter is
trivial. Suppose i : B ⊢ ⊥ is an isomorphism. Then from
kˆ1⊥,⊥ ◦ 〈i ◦ f, i ◦ g〉 = kˆ
2
⊥,⊥
◦ 〈i ◦ f, i ◦ g〉
we obtain i ◦ f = i ◦ g, which yields f = g. We proceed analogously if A is
isomorphic to ⊤. ⊣
Lemma 2. If for f, g : A ⊢ B we have Gf = Gg = ∅, then f = g.
Proof. This proof depends on the Standard-Form Lemma above. We write
down f in the standard form f2 ◦ f1 for f1 : A ⊢ C and g in the standard form
g2 ◦ g1 for g1 : A ⊢ D. Since kˇi and κˇ do not occur in f1, for every occurrence
z of a propositional letter in C we have an occurrence x of that propositional
letter in A such that (x, z) ∈ Gf1, and since kˆi and κˆ do not occur in f2, for
every occurrence z of a propositional letter in C we have an occurrence y of
that propositional letter in B such that (z, y) ∈ Gf2. So if C were not letterless,
then Gf would not be empty. We conclude analogously that D, as well as C, is
a letterless formula.
If both C and D are isomorphic to ⊤ or ⊥, then we have an isomorphism
i : C ⊢ D, and f = f2 ◦ i−1 ◦ i ◦ f1. By Lemma 1, we have i ◦ f1 = g1 and
f2 ◦ i
−1 = g2, from which f = g follows. If i : C ⊢ ⊥ and j : ⊤ ⊢ D are
isomorphisms, then by Lemma 1 we have
f2 ◦ f1 = g2 ◦ j ◦ κˆ⊥ ◦ i ◦ f1 = g2 ◦ g1,
and so f = g. (Note that κˆ⊥ = κˇ⊤.) ⊣
We can then prove the following.
Sesquicartesian Coherence. The functor G from L⊥ to Rel is faithful.
Proof. We have Lemma 2 for the case when Gf = Gg = ∅. When Gf =
Gg 6= ∅, we proceed as in the proof of Lattice Coherence, appealing if need
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there is to Lemma 2, until we reach the case when A is A1 ∧A2 or a letter, and
B is B1 ∨ B2 or a letter, but A and B are not both letters. In that case, by
Composition Elimination, the arrow term f is equal in L⊥ either to an arrow
term of the form f ′ ◦ kˆiA1,A2 , or to an arrow term of the form kˇ
i
B1,B2
◦ f ′. Suppose
f = f ′ ◦ kˆ1A1,A2 . Then for every (x, y) ∈ Gf we have that x is in A1. (We reason
analogously when f = f ′ ◦ kˆ2A1,A2 .)
By Composition Elimination too, g is equal in L⊥ either to an arrow term
of the form g′ ◦ kˆiA1,A2 , or to an arrow term of the form kˇ
i
B1,B2
◦ g′. In the first
case we must have g = g′ ◦ kˆ1A1,A2 , because Gg = G(f
′
◦ kˆ1A1,A2) 6= ∅, and then we
apply the induction hypothesis to derive f ′ = g′ from Gf ′ = Gg′. Hence f = g
in L⊥.
Suppose g = kˇ1B1,B2
◦ g′. (We reason analogously when g = kˇ2B1,B2
◦ g′.) Let
f ′′ : A1 ⊢ B1 ∨B′′2 be the substitution instance of f
′ : A1 ⊢ B1 ∨B2 obtained
by replacing every occurrence of propositional letter in B2 by ⊥. There is
an isomorphism i : B′′2 ⊢ ⊥, and f
′′ exists because in Gf , which is equal to
G(kˇ1B1,B2
◦ g′), there is no pair (x, y) with y in B2. So we have an arrow
f ′′′ : A1 ⊢ B1, which we define as [1B1 , κˇB1 ] ◦ (1B1 ∨ i) ◦ f
′′. It is easy to verify
that G(kˇ1B1,B2
◦ f ′′′) = Gf ′, and that G(f ′′′ ◦ kˆ1A1,A2) = Gg
′. By the induction
hypothesis, we obtain kˇ1B1,B2
◦ f ′′′ = f ′ and f ′′′ ◦ kˆ1A1,A2 = g
′, from which we de-
rive f = g. We reason analogously when f = kˇiB1,B2
◦ f ′. ⊣
From Sesquicartesian Coherence we infer coherence for L⊤, which is isomor-
phic to Lop⊥ .
7 Restricted coherence for dicartesian categories
For dicartesian categories we can prove easily a simple restricted coherence
result, which was sufficient for the needs of [14]. A more general, but still
restricted, coherence result with respect to Rel, falling short of full coherence,
may be found in the revised version of [10] (Section 7). We present first the
simple restricted coherence result, and will deal with the more general restricted
coherence result later on.
We define inductively formulae of L⊤,⊥ in disjunctive normal form (dnf ):
every ∨-free formula is in dnf, and if A and B are both in dnf, then A ∨ B is
in dnf. We define dually formulae of L⊤,⊥ in conjunctive normal form (cnf ):
every ∧-free formula is in cnf, and if A and B are both in cnf, then A ∧B is in
cnf.
Restricted Dicartesian Coherence. Let f, g : A ⊢ B be arrow terms of
L⊤,⊥ such that A is in dnf and B in cnf. If Gf = Gg, then f = g in L⊤,⊥.
Proof. If Gf = Gg = ∅, then we apply Lemma 2. If Gf = Gg 6= ∅, then we
proceed as in the proof of Lattice Coherence, by induction on the sum of the
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lengths of A and B, appealing if need there is to Lemma 2, until we reach the
case when A is A1 ∧ A2 or a letter, and B is B1 ∨ B2 or a letter, but A and
B are not both letters. In that case there is no occurrence of ∨ in A and no
occurrence of ∧ in B. We then rely on the composition-free form of f and g in
L⊤,⊥ and on the equation (KˆKˇ). ⊣
To improve upon this result we need the following lemma for L⊤,⊥, and the
definitions that follow. This lemma is analogous up to a point to the Invertibility
Lemma for ∨.
Lemma 3. Let f : A ⊢ B1 ∨B2 be a Gentzen term such that Gf 6= ∅ and ∨ does
not occur in A. If for every (x, y) ∈ Gf we have that y is in B1, then there is
a Gentzen term g : A ⊢ B1 such that Gf = GKˇ
1
B2
g.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the length ofA. Suppose f is a composition-
free Gentzen term. If A is a propositional letter, then by the assumption on Gf
we have that f is of the form Kˇ1B2f
′, and we can take that g is f ′.
If A is not a propositional letter and f is not of the form Kˇ1B2f
′ (by the
assumption onGf , the Gentzen term f cannot be of the form Kˇ2B1f
′), then, since
∨ does not occur in A, we have that f is of the form KˆiA′′f
′ for f ′ : A′ ⊢ B1 ∨B2.
Note that Gf ′ 6= ∅ and ∨ does not occur in A′. Since for every (x, y) in Gf ′ we
have that y is in B1, we may apply the induction hypothesis to f
′ and obtain
g′ : A′ ⊢ B1 such that Gf ′ = GKˇ1B2g
′. By relying on the equation (KˆKˇ), we
can take that g is KˆiA′′g
′. ⊣
A formula C of L⊤,⊥ is called a contradiction when there is in L⊤,⊥ an
arrow of the type C ⊢ ⊥. For every formula that is not a contradiction there
is a substitution instance isomorphic to ⊤. Suppose C is not a contradiction,
and let C⊤ be obtained from C by substituting ⊤ for every propositional letter.
If C⊤ were not isomorphic to ⊤, then since every letterless formula of L⊤,⊥
is isomorphic in L⊤,⊥ either to ⊤ or to ⊥, we would have an isomorphism
i : C⊤ ⊢ ⊥. Since there is obviously an arrow u : C ⊢ C⊤ formed by using κˆp,
we would have i ◦u : C ⊢ ⊥, and C would be a contradiction.
A formula C of L⊤,⊥ is called a tautology when there is in L⊤,⊥ an arrow of
the type ⊤ ⊢ C. For every formula that is not a tautology there is a substitution
instance isomorphic to ⊥. (This is shown analogously to what we had in the
preceding paragraph.)
A formula of L⊤,⊥ is called ⊥-normal when for every subformula D ∧ C or
C ∧D of it with C a contradiction, there is no occurrence of ∨ in D. A formula
of L⊤,⊥ is called ⊤-normal when for every subformula D∨C or C ∨D of it with
C a tautology, there is no occurrence of ∧ in D.
We can now formulate our second partial coherence result for dicartesian
categories.
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Restricted Dicartesian Coherence II. If f, g : A ⊢ B are terms of L⊤,⊥
such that Gf = Gg and either A is ⊥-normal or B is ⊤-normal, then f = g in
L⊤,⊥.
Proof. Suppose A is ⊥-normal. Lemma 2 covers the case when Gf = Gg = ∅.
So we assume Gf = Gg 6= ∅, and proceed as in the proof of Sesquicartesian
Coherence by induction on the sum of the lengths of A and B. The basis of
this induction and the cases when A is of the form A1 ∨ A2 or B is of the form
B1 ∧B2 are settled as in the proof of Sesquicartesian Coherence.
Suppose A is A1 ∧ A2 or a propositional letter and B is B1 ∨B2 or a propo-
sitional letter, but A and B are not both propositional letters. (The cases when
A or B is a constant object are excluded by the assumption that Gf = Gg 6= ∅.)
We proceed then as in the proof of Sesquicartesian Coherence until we reach
the case when f = f ′ ◦ kˆ1A1,A2 and g = kˇ
1
B1,B2
◦ g′.
Suppose A2 is not a contradiction. Then there is an instance A
⊤
2 of A2 and
an isomorphism i : ⊤ ⊢ A⊤2 . (To obtain A
⊤
2 we substitute ⊤ for every letter in
A2.) Let g
′′ : A1 ∧ A
⊤
2 ⊢ B1 be the substitution instance of g
′ : A1 ∧ A2 ⊢ B1
obtained by replacing every occurrence of propositional letter in A2 by ⊤. Such
a term exists because in Gg, which is equal to G(f ′ ◦ kˆ1A1,A2), there is no pair
(x, y) with x in A2.
So we have an arrow g′′′ = g′′ ◦ (1A1 ∧ i) ◦ 〈1A1 , κˆA1〉 : A1 ⊢ B1. It is easy
to verify that G(kˇ1B1,B2
◦ g′′′) = Gf ′ and that G(g′′′ ◦ kˆ1A1,A2) = Gg
′. By the
induction hypothesis we obtain kˇ1B1,B2
◦ g′′′ = f ′ and g′′′ ◦ kˆ1A1,A2 = g
′, from
which we derive f = g.
Suppose A2 is a contradiction. Then by the assumption that A is ⊥-
normal we have that ∨ does not occur in A1. We may apply Lemma 3 to
f ′ : A1 ⊢ B1 ∨B2 to obtain f ′′′ : A1 ⊢ B1 such that Gf ′ = G(kˇ1B1,B2 ◦ f
′′′). It
is easy to verify that then Gg′ = G(f ′′′ ◦ kˆ1A1,A2), and we may proceed as in the
proof of Sesquicartesian Coherence.
We proceed analogously when B is ⊤-normal, relying on a lemma dual to
Lemma 3. ⊣
Consider the following definitions:
A0⊥= A ∧ ⊥, A
n+1
⊥ = (A
n
⊥ ∨⊤) ∧⊥,
f0⊥ = f ∧ 1⊥, f
n+1
⊥ = (f
n
⊥ ∨ 1⊤) ∧ 1⊥,
A0⊤= A ∨ ⊤, A
n+1
⊤ = (A
n
⊤ ∧⊥) ∨⊤,
f0⊤ = f ∨ 1⊤, f
n+1
⊤ = (f
n
⊤ ∧ 1⊥) ∨ 1⊤.
Then for fn being
(kˇ1A,⊤ ∧ 1⊥)
n
⊤
◦ kˆ1(A∧⊥)n
⊤
,⊥ : A
n+1
⊥ ⊢ A
n+1
⊤
and gn being
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kˇ1(A∨⊤)n
⊥
,⊤
◦ (kˆ1A,⊥ ∨ 1⊤)
n
⊥ : A
n+1
⊥ ⊢ A
n+1
⊤
we have Gfn = Ggn, but we suppose that fn = gn does not hold in L⊤,⊥. The
equation f0 = g0 is
((kˇ1A,⊤ ∧ 1⊥) ∨ 1⊤) ◦ kˆ
1
(A∧⊥)∨⊤,⊥ = kˇ
1
(A∨⊤)∧⊥,⊤
◦ (kˆ1A,⊥ ∨ 1⊤) ∧ 1⊥ :
((A ∧ ⊥) ∨ ⊤) ∧ ⊥ ⊢ ((A ∨⊤) ∧ ⊥) ∨ ⊤.
Note that An+1⊥ is not ⊥-normal, and A
n+1
⊤ is not ⊤-normal.
We don’t know whether it is sufficient to add to L⊤,⊥ the equations f
n = gn
for every n ≥ 0 in order to obtain full coherence for the resulting category.
As a corollary of Restricted Dicartesian Coherence II, we obtain that if
f, g : A ⊢ B are terms of L⊤,⊥ such that Gf = Gg, while A and B are isomorphic
either to formulae of L (i.e. to formulae in which ⊤ and ⊥ do not occur) or to
letterless formulae, then f = g in L⊤,⊥. This corollary is analogous to the
restricted coherence result for symmetric monoidal closed categories of Kelly
and Mac Lane in [19] (see [15], Section 3.1).
8 Maximality
A syntactically built category such as L and L⊤,⊥ is calledmaximal when adding
any new axiomatic equation between arrow terms of this category yields a cat-
egory that is a preorder. The new axiomatic equation is supposed to be closed
under substitution for propositional letters, as the equations of L and L⊤,⊥ were.
(This notion of maximality for syntactical categories is defined more precisely
in [14], Section 9.3.) Maximality is an interesting property when the initial cat-
egory, like L and L⊤,⊥ here, is not itself a preorder. We will deal in subsequent
sections with maximality for L and L⊤,⊥.
The maximality property above is analogous to the property of usual for-
mulations of the classical propositional calculus called Post completeness. That
this calculus is Post complete means that if we add to it any new axiom-schema
in the language of the calculus, then we can prove every formula. An analogue
of Bo¨hm’s Theorem in the typed lambda calculus implies, similarly, that the
typed lambda calculus cannot be extended without falling into triviality, i.e.
without every equation (between terms of the same type) becoming derivable
(see [26], [8] and references therein; see [1], Section 10.4, for Bo¨hm’s Theorem
in the untyped lambda calculus).
Let us now consider several examples of common algebraic structures with
analogous maximality properties. First, we have that semilattices are maximal
in the following sense.
Let a and b be terms made exclusively of variables and of a binary operation
·, which we interpret as meet or join. That the equation a = b holds in a
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semilattice S means that every instance of a = b obtained by substituting names
of elements of S for variables holds in S. Suppose a = b does not hold in a free
semilattice SF (so it is not the case that a = b holds in every semilattice). Hence
there must be an instance of a = b obtained by substituting names of elements
of SF for variables such that this instance does not hold in SF . It is easy to
conclude that in a = b there must be at least two variables, and that SF must
have at least two free generators. Then every semilattice in which a = b holds
is trivial—namely, it has a single element.
Here is a short proof of that. If a = b does not hold in SF , then there must
be a variable x in one of a and b that is not in the other. Then from a = b, by
substituting y for every variable in a and b different from x, and by applying
the semilattice equations, we infer either x = y or x · y = y. If we have x = y,
we are done, and, if we have x · y = y, then we have also y · x = x, and hence
x = y.
Semilattices with unit, distributive lattices, distributive lattices with top and
bottom, and Boolean algebras are maximal in the same sense. The equations
a = b in question are equations between terms made exclusively of variables
and the operations of the kind of algebra we envisage: semilattices with unit,
distributive lattices, etc. That such an equation holds in a particular structure
means, as above, that every substitution instance of it holds. However, the
number of variables in a = b and the number of generators of the free structure
mentioned need not always be at least two.
If we deal with semilattices with unit 1, then a = b must have at least one
variable, and the free semilattice with unit must have at least one free generator.
We substitute 1 for every variable in a and b different from x in order to obtain
x = 1, and hence triviality. So semilattices with unit are maximal in the same
sense.
The same sort of maximality can be proven for distributive lattices, whose
operations are ∧ and ∨, which we call conjunction and disjunction, respectively.
Then every term made of ∧, ∨ and variables is equal to a term in disjunctive
normal form (i.e. a multiple disjunction of multiple conjunctions of variables;
see the preceding section for a precise definition), and to a term in conjunctive
normal form (i.e. a multiple conjunction of multiple disjunctions of variables;
see the preceding section). These normal forms are not unique. If a = b, in
which we must have at least two variables, does not hold in a free distributive
lattice DF with at least two free generators, then either a ≤ b or b ≤ a does not
hold in DF . Suppose a ≤ b does not hold in DF . Let a′ be a disjunctive normal
form of a, and let b′ be a conjunctive normal form of b. So a′ ≤ b′ does not hold
in DF . From that we infer that for a disjunct a
′′ of a′ and for a conjunct b′′ of b′
we do not have a′′ ≤ b′′ in DF . This means that there is no variable in common
in a′′ and b′′; otherwise, the conjunction of variables a′′ would be lesser than or
equal in DF to the disjunction of variables b
′′. If in a distributive lattice a = b
holds, then a′′ ≤ b′′ holds too, and hence, by substitution, we obtain x ≤ y. So
x = y.
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For distributive lattices with top ⊤ and bottom ⊥, we proceed analogously
via disjunctive and conjunctive normal form. Here a = b may be even without
variables, and the free structure may have even an empty set of free generators.
The additional cases to consider are when in a′′ ≤ b′′ we have that a′′ is ⊤ and
b′′ is ⊥. In any case, we obtain ⊤ ≤ ⊥, and hence our structure is trivial.
The same sort of maximality can be proven for Boolean algebras, i.e. com-
plemented distributive lattices. Boolean algebras must have top and bottom.
In a disjunctive normal form now the disjuncts are conjunctions of variables
x or terms x¯, where ¯ is complementation, or the disjunctive normal form is
just ⊤ or ⊥; analogously for conjunctive normal forms. Then we proceed as for
distributive lattices with an equation a = b that may be even without variables,
until we reach that a′′ ≤ b′′, which does not hold in a free Boolean algebra BF ,
whose set of free generators may be even empty, holds in our Boolean algebra.
If x is a conjunct of a′′, then in b′′ we cannot have a disjunct x; but we may
have a disjunct x¯. The same holds for the conjuncts x¯ of a′′. It is excluded
that both x and x¯ are conjuncts of a′′, or disjuncts of b′′; otherwise, a′′ ≤ b′′
would hold in BF . Then for every conjunct x in a
′′ and every disjunct y¯ in b′′
we substitute ⊤ for x and y, and for every other variable we substitute ⊥. In
any case, we obtain ⊤ ≤ ⊥, and hence our Boolean algebra is trivial. This is es-
sentially the proof of Post completeness for the classical propositional calculus,
due to Bernays and Hilbert (see [28], Section 2.4, and [16], Section I.13), from
which we can infer the ordinary completeness of this calculus with respect to
valuations in the two-element Boolean algebra—namely, with respect to truth
tables—and also completeness with respect to any nontrivial model.
As examples of common algebraic structures that are not maximal in the
sense above, we have semigroups, commutative semigroups, lattices, and many
others. What is maximal for semilattices and is not maximal for lattices is the
equational theory of the structures in question. The equational theory of semi-
lattices cannot be extended without falling into triviality, while the equational
theory of lattices can be extended with the distributive law, for example.
The notions of maximality envisaged in this section were extreme (or should
we say “maximal”), in the sense that we envisaged collapsing only into preorder.
For semilattices, distributive lattices, etc., this is also preorder for a one-object
category. We may, however, envisage relativizing our notion of maximality by
replacing preorder with a weaker property, such that structures possessing it are
trivial, but not so trivial (cf. [7], Section 4.11). We will encounter maximality
in such a relative sense in the last section.
As an example of relative maximality in a common algebraic structure we can
take symmetric groups. Consider the standard axioms for the symmetric group
Sn, where n ≥ 2, with the generators si, for i ∈ {1, . . . , n−1}, corresponding to
transpositions of immediate neighbours (see [6], Section 6.2). If to Sn for n ≥ 5
we add an equation a = 1 where a is built exclusively of the generators si of Sn
with composition, and a = 1 does not hold in Sn, then we can derive si = sj .
This does not mean that the resulting structure will be a one-element structure,
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i.e. the trivial one-element group. It will be such if a is an odd permutation,
and if a is an even permutation, then we will obtain a two-element structure,
which is S2. This can be inferred from facts about the normal subgroups of
Sn. Simple groups are maximal in the nonrelative sense, envisaged above for
semilattices.
9 Maximality of lattice categories
We will show in this section that L is maximal in the sense specified at the
beginning of the preceding section; namely, in the interesting way. (We take
over this result from [11], Section 5, and [14], Section 9.5.)
Suppose A and B are formulae of L in which only p occurs as a letter. If for
some arrow terms f1, f2 : A ⊢ B of L we have Gf1 6= Gf2, then for some x in A
and some y in B we have (x, y) ∈ Gf1 and (x, y) 6∈ Gf2, or vice versa. Suppose
(x, y) ∈ Gf1 and (x, y) 6∈ Gf2.
For every subformula C of A and every formula D let ACD be the formula
obtained from A by replacing the particular occurrence of the formula C in A
by D. It can be shown that for every subformula A1∨A2 of A we have an arrow
term h : AA1∨A2Aj ⊢ A of L, built by using kˇ
j
A1,A2
, such that there is an x′ in
AA1∨A2Aj for which (x
′, x) ∈ Gh. Hence, for such an h, we have (x′, y) ∈ G(f1 ◦h)
and (x′, y) 6∈ G(f2 ◦ h).
We compose fi repeatedly with such arrow terms until we obtain the arrow
terms f ′i : p ∧ . . . ∧ p ⊢ B of L such that parentheses are somehow associated in
p∧ . . .∧ p and for some z in (p∧ . . .∧ p) we have (z, y) ∈ Gf ′1 and (z, y) 6∈ Gf
′
2.
The formula p ∧ . . . ∧ p may also be only p. We may further compose f ′i with
other arrow terms of L in order to obtain the arrow terms f ′′i of type p∧A
′ ⊢ B
or p ⊢ B such that A′ is of the form p ∧ . . . ∧ p with parentheses somehow
associated. Let us use 0 to denote the first occurrence of a propositional letter
in a formula, counting from the left. So we have (0, y) ∈ Gf ′′1 but (0, y) 6∈ Gf
′′
2 .
By working dually on B we obtain the arrow terms f ′′′i of L of type p∧A
′ ⊢
p ∨ B′, for A′ of the form p ∧ . . . ∧ p and B′ of the form p ∨ . . . ∨ p, or of type
p ∧ A′ ⊢ p, or of type p ⊢ p ∨ B′, such that (0, 0) ∈ Gf ′′′1 and (0, 0) 6∈ Gf
′′′
2 .
(We cannot obtain that f ′′′1 and f
′′′
2 are of type p ⊢ p, since, otherwise, by
Composition Elimination for L, f ′′′2 would not exist.)
There is an arrow term h∧ : p ⊢ p∧ . . .∧ p of L defined by using wˆ such that
for every x ∈ G(p ∧ . . . ∧ p) we have (0, x) ∈ Gh∧. We define analogously with
the help of wˇ an arrow term h∨ : p ∨ . . . ∨ p ⊢ p of L such that for every x in
p∨ . . .∨ p we have (x, 0) ∈ Gh∨. The arrow terms h∧ and h∨ may be 1p : p ⊢ p.
If f ′′′i is of type p ∧ A
′ ⊢ p ∨B′, let f †i : p ∧ p ⊢ p ∨ p be defined by
f
†
i =df (1p ∨ h
∨) ◦ f ′′′i ◦ (1p ∨ h
∧).
By Composition Elimination for L, we have that Gf †i must be a singleton. Let
us use 1 to denote the second occurrence of a propositional letter in a formula,
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counting from the left. If (1, 0) or (1, 1) belongs to Gf †2 , then for f
∗
i : p ∧ p ⊢ p
defined as wˇp ◦ f
†
i we have (0, 0) ∈ Gf
∗
1 and (0, 0) 6∈ Gf
∗
2 . If (0, 1) or (1, 1)
belongs to Gf †2 , then for f
∗
i : p ⊢ p ∨ p defined as f
†
i
◦ wˆp we have (0, 0) ∈ Gf∗1
and (0, 0) 6∈ Gf∗2 .
If f ′′′i is of type p ∧ A
′ ⊢ p, then for f∗i : p ∧ p ⊢ p defined as f
′′′
i
◦ (1p ∨ h
∧)
we have (0, 0) ∈ Gf∗1 and (0, 0) 6∈ Gf
∗
2 .
If f ′′′i is of type p ⊢ p ∨ B
′, then for f∗i : p ⊢ p ∨ p defined as (1p ∨ h
∨) ◦ f ′′′i
we have (0, 0) ∈ Gf∗1 and (0, 0) 6∈ Gf
∗
2 . In all that we have by Composition
Elimination for L that Gf∗i must be a singleton.
In cases where f∗i is of type p ∧ p ⊢ p, by Composition Elimination for L,
by the conditions on Gf∗1 and Gf
∗
2 , and by the functoriality of G, we obtain in
L the equation f∗i = kˆ
i
p,p. (This follows from Lattice Coherence too.) So in L
extended with f1 = f2 we can derive the equation
(kˆ kˆ) kˆ1p,p = kˆ
2
p,p.
In cases where f∗i is of type p ⊢ p∨ p, we conclude analogously that we have
in L the equation f∗i = kˇ
i
p,p, and so in L extended with f1 = f2 we can derive
(kˇ kˇ) kˇ1p,p = kˇ
2
p,p.
If either of (kˆ kˆ) and (kˇ kˇ) holds in a lattice category A, then A is a preorder.
It remains to remark that if for some arrow terms g1 and g2 of L of the
same type we have that g1 = g2 does not hold for L, then by Lattice Coherence
we have Gg1 6= Gg2. If we take the substitution instances g′1 of g1 and g
′
2 of
g2 obtained by replacing every letter by a single letter p, then we obtain again
Gg′1 6= Gg
′
2. If g1 = g2 holds in a lattice category A, then g
′
1 = g
′
2 holds too,
and A is a preorder, as we have shown above. This concludes the proof of
maximality for L. (In the original presentation of this proof in [11], Section 5,
there are some slight inaccuracies in the definition of f∗i .)
10 Relative maximality of dicartesian categories
The category L⊤,⊥ is not maximal in the sense in which L is. This is shown by
the following counterexample.
Let Set∗ be the category whose objects are sets with a distinguished element
∗, and whose arrows are ∗-preserving functions f between these sets; namely,
f(∗) = ∗. This category is isomorphic to the category of sets with partial
functions. The following definitions serve to show that Set∗ is a category in
which we can interpret the objects and arrow terms of L⊤,⊥:
I = {∗}, a′ = {(x, ∗) | x ∈ a− I}, b′′ = {(∗, y) | y ∈ b− I},
a⊗ b = ((a− I) ∧ (b− I)) ∪ I,
a ✷× b = (a⊗ b) ∪ a′ ∪ b′′,
a ✷+ b = a′ ∪ b′′ ∪ I.
27
Note that a ✷× b is isomorphic in Set to the cartesian product a× b; the element
∗ of a ✷× b corresponds to the element (∗, ∗) of a× b.
The functions kˆia1,a2 : a1 ✷× a2 → ai, for i ∈ {1, 2}, are defined by
kˆia1,a2(x1, x2) = xi, kˆ
i
a1,a2
(∗) = ∗;
for fi : c→ ai, the function 〈f1, f2〉 : c→ a1 ✷× a2 is defined by
〈f1, f2〉(z) =
{
(f1(z), f2(z)) if f1(z) 6= ∗ or f2(z) 6= ∗
∗ if f1(z) = f2(z) = ∗;
and the function κˆa : a → I is defined by κˆa(x) = ∗. Having in mind the
isomorphism between a ✷× b and a × b mentioned above, the functions kˆia1,a2 :
a1 ✷× a2 → ai correspond to the projection functions, while 〈 , 〉 corresponds
to the usual pairing operation on functions.
The functions kˇia1,a2 : ai → a1 ✷+ a2 are defined by
kˇ1a1,a2(x) = (x, ∗), kˇ
2
a1,a2
(x) = (∗, x), for x 6= ∗,
kˇia1,a2(∗) = ∗;
for gi : ai → c, the function [g1, g2] : a1 ✷+ a2 → c is defined by
[g1, g2](x1, x2) = gi(xi), for xi 6= ∗,
[g1, g2](∗) = ∗;
finally, the function κˇa : I→ a is defined by κˇa(∗) = ∗.
If we take that ∧ is ✷× and ∨ is ✷+, then it can be checked in a straightforward
manner that Set∗ and Set∗ without I are lattice categories, and if in Set∗ we
take further that both ⊤ and ⊥ are I, then Set∗ is a dicartesian category.
Consider now the category Set∅∗, which is obtained by adding to Set∗ the
empty set ∅ as a new object, and the empty functions ∅a : ∅ → a as new arrows.
The identity arrow 1∅ is ∅∅. For Set
∅
∗, we enlarge the definitions above by
∅ ✷× a = a ✷× ∅ = ∅,
∅ ✷+ a = a ✷+ ∅ = a,
kˆia1,a2 = ∅ai , for a1 = ∅ or a2 = ∅,
〈∅a1 , ∅a2〉 = ∅a1✷×a2 ,
κˆ∅ = ∅I,
kˇia1,a2 = ∅a1✷+a2 , for ai = ∅,
[f1, ∅c] = f1, [∅c, f2] = f2,
and define now the function κˇa : ∅ → a by κˇa = ∅a. Then it can be checked
that Set∅∗ where ∧ is ✷× and ∨ is ✷+ as before, while ⊤ is I and ⊥ is ∅, is a
dicartesian category too.
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In L⊤,⊥ the equation kˆ
1
p,⊥ = κˇp ◦ kˆ
2
p,⊥ does not hold, because Gkˆ
1
p,⊥ 6= ∅ and
G(κˇp ◦ kˆ
2
p,⊥) = ∅, but in Set
∅
∗ this equation holds, because both sides are equal
to ∅∅. Since Set
∅
∗ is not a preorder, we can conclude that L⊤,⊥ is not maximal.
Although this maximality fails, the category L⊤,⊥ may be shown maximal
in a relative sense. This relative maximality result, which we are going to
demonstrate now, says that every dicartesian category that satisfies an equation
f = g between arrow terms of L⊤,⊥ such that Gf 6= Gg (which implies that
f = g is not in L⊤,⊥) satisfies also some particular equations. These equations
do not give preorder in general, but a kind of “contextual” preorder. Moreover,
when L⊤,⊥ is extended with some of these equations we obtain a maximal
category.
If for some arrow terms f1, f2 : A ⊢ B of L⊤,⊥ we have Gf1 6= Gf2, then for
some x in A and some y in B we have (x, y) ∈ Gf1 and (x, y) 6∈ Gf2, or vice
versa. Suppose (x, y) ∈ Gf1 and (x, y) 6∈ Gf2. Suppose x is an occurrence of p,
so that y must be an occurrence of p too.
Let A′ be the formula obtained from the formula A by replacing x by p∧⊥,
and every other occurrence of letter or ⊤ by ⊥. Dually, let B′ be the formula
obtained from B by replacing y by p∨⊤, and every other occurrence of letter or
⊥ by ⊤. Let us use 0, as in the preceding section, to denote the first occurrence
of a propositional letter in a formula, counting from the left. Then it can be
shown that there is an arrow term hA : A′ ⊢ A of L⊤,⊥ such that GhA = {(0, x)},
and an arrow term hB : B ⊢ B′ of L⊤,⊥ such that GhB = {(y, 0)}. We build hA
with kˆ1p,⊥ : p∧⊥ ⊢ p and instances of κˇC : ⊥ ⊢ C, with the help of the operations
∧ and ∨ on arrow terms. Analogously, hB is built with kˇ1p,⊤ : p ⊢ p ∨ ⊤ and
instances of κˆC : C ⊢ ⊤. It can also be shown that there are arrow terms
jA : p ∧ ⊥ ⊢ A′ and jB : B′ ⊢ p ∨ ⊤ of L⊤,⊥ such that GjA = GjB = {(0, 0)}.
These arrow terms stand for isomorphisms of L⊤,⊥.
Then it is clear that for f ′i being
jB ◦ hB ◦ fi ◦h
A
◦ jA : p ∧ ⊥ ⊢ p ∨⊤,
with i ∈ {1, 2}, we have Gf ′1 = {(0, 0)}, while Gf
′
2 = ∅. Hence, by Composition
Elimination for L⊤,⊥ and by the functoriality of G, we obtain in L⊤,⊥ the
equations
f ′1 = kˇ
1
p,⊤
◦ kˆ1p,⊥,
f ′2 = κˇp∨⊤ ◦ kˆ
2
p,⊥ = kˇ
2
p,⊤
◦ κˆp∧⊥.
(This follows from Restricted Dicartesian Coherence too.) If we write 0⊥,⊤ for
κˆ⊥, which is equal to κˇ⊤ in L⊤,⊥, then in L⊤,⊥ we have
f ′2 = kˇ
2
p,⊤
◦ 0⊥,⊤ ◦ kˆ
2
p,⊥.
So in L⊤,⊥ extended with f1 = f2 we can derive
(kˆ kˇ) kˇ1p,⊤ ◦ kˆ
1
p,⊥ = kˇ
2
p,⊤
◦0⊥,⊤ ◦ kˆ
2
p,⊥.
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The equation
(kˆ κˇ) kˆ1p,⊥ = κˇp ◦ kˆ
2
p,⊥,
which holds in Set∅∗, and which we have used above for showing the nonmaxi-
mality of L⊤,⊥, clearly yields (kˆ kˇ), which hence holds in Set
∅
∗, and which hence
we could have also used for showing this nonmaximality.
If we refine the procedure above by building A′ and B′ out of A and B more
carefully, then in some cases we could derive (kˆ κˇ) or its dual
(kˇ κˆ) kˇ1p,⊤ = kˇ
2
p,⊤
◦ κˆp
instead of (kˆ kˇ). We do not replace x by p∧⊥ in building A′, and we can proceed
more selectively with other occurrences of letters and ⊤ in A, in order to obtain
an A′ isomorphic to p if possible. We can proceed analogously when we build
B′ out of B to obtain a B′ isomorphic to p if possible.
Note that we have the following:
κˇp∧⊥ ◦ kˆ
2
p,⊥ = 〈κˇp,1⊥〉 ◦ kˆ
2
p,⊥
= 〈kˆ1p,⊥, kˆ
2
p,⊥〉, with (kˆ κˇ),
= 1p∧⊥.
In the other direction, it is clear that the equation derived yields (kˆ κˇ). So with
(kˆ κˇ) we have that C ∧⊥ and ⊥ are isomorphic, and, analogously, with (kˇ κˆ) we
have that C ∨⊤ and ⊤ are isomorphic. It can be shown that the natural logical
category defined as L⊤,⊥ save that we assume in addition both (kˆ κˇ) and (kˇ κˆ)
is maximal. (This is achieved by eliminating letterless subformulae from C and
D in g1, g2 : C ⊢ D such that Gg1 6= Gg2, and falling upon the argument used
for the maximality of L in the preceding section.)
If f : a ⊢ b is any arrow of a dicartesian category A and (kˆ kˇ) holds in A,
then we have in A
kˇ1b,⊤ ◦ f ◦ kˆ
1
a,⊥ = kˇ
1
b,⊤
◦ kˆ1b,⊥ ◦ (f ∧ 1⊥)
= kˇ2b,⊤ ◦ 0⊥,⊤ ◦ kˆ
2
a,⊥,
and hence for f, g : a ⊢ b we have in A
(kˆ kˇfg) kˇ1b,⊤ ◦ f ◦ kˆ
1
a,⊥ = kˇ
1
b,⊤
◦ g ◦ kˆ1a,⊥.
So, although L⊤,⊥ is not maximal, it is maximal in the relative sense that
every dicartesian category that satisfies an equation f = g between arrow terms
of L⊤,⊥ such that Gf 6= Gg satisfies also (kˆ kˇ) and (kˆ kˇfg). Some of these
dicartesian categories may satisfy more than just (kˆ kˇ) and (kˆ kˇfg). They may
satisfy (kˆ κˇ) or (kˇ κˆ), which yields
f ◦ kˆ1a,⊥ = g ◦ kˆ
1
a,⊥ or kˇ
1
b,⊤
◦ f = kˇ1b,⊤ ◦ g,
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and some may be preorders.
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